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18-4 US-USSR
TELEGRAM

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 RSC-01 RSR-01 SS-14 FILE-01 SSO-00 CCO-00
NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02
INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 PRS-01 GAC-01 SSI-05
EUR-20 IO-12 AEC-11 T-43

O 070640Z MAY 72
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0049

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 5028

SECTO 36

SUBJECT: KISSINGER AND SMITH SALT BACKGROUNDER - PART ONE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KISSINGER AND SMITH 10:05 PM MAY 26
BACKGROUNDER ON SALT.

THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CONFERENCE OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND
AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH, DIRECTOR ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SPASP HOUSE, 10:05 PM MAY 26

MR. ZIEGLER: GENTLEMEN, WE HAVE ONLY A VERY SHORT
PERIOD HERE. DR. KISSINGER AND AMBASSADOR SMITH ARE HERE
TO PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME GENERAL DETAILS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT
WHICH WILL BE SIGNED TONIGHT AT ABOUT 11:00 O'CLOCK AT THE
KREMLIN. IT WILL BE SIGNED AT THE SAME LOCATION IN WHICH THE
OTHER AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION.

THE MATERIAL THAT WE ARE GIVING YOU NOW, THE FACT
SHEET AND ALSO THE COMMENTS THAT DR. KISSINGER WILL MAKE, WILL
BE EMBARGOED TOTALLY UNTIL 11:00 O'CLOCK, OR AT THE TIME OF

OMB-DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY

DATE

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE

TS AUTH. REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

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THE SIGNING CEREMONY. I BELIEVE THE SIGNING CEREMONY WILL BE CARRIED ON TELEVISION INTO THE PRESS CENTER SO THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO OBSERVE IT AT THAT TIME.

AS WE MENTIONED TO YOU IN THE BRIEFING EARLIER TODAY, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SIGNING CEREMONY, WITHIN 20 OR 30 MINUTES AFTER THE SIGNING CEREMONY, WE WILL HAVE AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THE PRESS CENTER COPIES OF THE AGREEMENT, AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOTH DELEGATIONS WILL BE THERE TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS AND TO DISCUSS THE AGREEMENT WITH YOU AT THAT TIME.

THE PURPOSE FOR THIS BRIEFING IS SIMPLY TO GIVE YOU A GENERAL OUTLINE AS TO HOW THE AGREEMENT DEVELOPED. AS YOU SEE, DR. KISSINGER AND AMBASSADOR SMITH ARE HERE NOW, SO I WILL GIVE YOU DR. KISSINGER. THIS IS ON THE RECORD.

DR. KISSINGER: GENTLEMEN, I THOUGHT THAT THE MOST USEFUL THING I COULD DO WAS TO GIVE YOU A GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF THE TREATY, AND AMBASSADOR SMITH, OF COURSE, WHO HAS CONDUCTED THE NEGOTIATIONS AND BROUGHT THEM TO THIS CONCLUSION IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO GO THROUGH THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT.

FIRST OF ALL, LET ME SAY ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT

THAT HE CERTAINLY WILL TAKE OCCASION TO EXPRESS PERSONALLY THAT THE REASON WE ARE HERE IS THE DEDICATION AND WORK OF THE DELEGATION IN HELSINKI WHICH HAS BEEN LED BY AMBASSADOR SMITH. HE HAS COME HERE STRAIGHT FROM THE AIRPORT. HE HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE FINAL WORK OF THIS AGREEMENT SINCE 5:00 O'CLOCK THIS MORNING. THIS CONCLUDES A RATHER HECTIC WEEK FOR EVERYBODY WHO HAS BEEN CONNECTED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

LET ME MAKE A FEW GENERAL OBSERVATIONS BEFORE I TURN THIS OVER TO AMBASSADOR SMITH.

NOTHING THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS DONE HAS SEEMED TO IT MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD THAN TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

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ALL OF US HAVE BEEN PROFOUNDLY CONVINCED THAT TO ARREST THE ARMS RACE IS ONE OF THE OVER-RIDING CONCERNS OF THIS PERIOD. NOW IT IS A SUBJECT OF ENORMOUS TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY, AND FOR THE TWO GREAT NUCLEAR POWERS TO MAKE A BEGINNING IN PUTTING THEIR ARMAMENTS UNDER SOME RESTRAINT REQUIRED POLITICAL DECISIONS AND AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF TECHNICAL WORK.

IT IS A PROCESS THAT HAS CONTINUED FOR MANY YEARS. IT STARTED WITH EXTENSIVE TECHNICAL STUDIES IN WASHINGTON. IT WENT THROUGH TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS ALTERNATING BETWEEN HELSINKI AND VIENNA. IT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION BECAUSE BOTH GOVERNMENTS DECIDED THAT IN AN AGREEMENT OF THIS KIND THE STAKES WERE LARGER THAN THE SIMPLE TECHNICAL ISSUES; THAT WHAT WAS AT STAKE WAS A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, CONFIDENCE AMONG NATIONS, AND A TURN IN THE PATTERN OF POST-WAR RELATIONSHIPS.

THIS IS WHY AT VARIOUS CRUCIAL MOMENTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THERE HAD BEEN DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND SOVIET LEADERS, WHICH LED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT TO BREAKTHROUGHS -- THE FIRST ON MAY 20 OF 1971, IN WHICH THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT THAT BROKE THE DEADLOCK THAT HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT AN AGREEMENT COVER ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS ONLY, AND OUR VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT INVOLVED AS WELL THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

THE COMPROMISE WAS THAT THE INITIAL TREATY WOULD DEAL WITH ABM'S, AND THAT THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A FREEZE ON CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THE NEXT DEADLOCK DEVELOPED OVER THE ISSUE OF WHAT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED, WHETHER IT SHOULD BE CONFINED TO INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES OR WHETHER SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS SHOULD ALSO BE INVOLVED. THE ANSWER -- THIS DEADLOCK WAS BROKEN AT THE END OF APRIL AND IN LARGE PART BY DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE SOVIET LEADERS AND THE PRESIDENT AND IT HAS FINALLY RESULTED IN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WHICH AMBASSADOR SMITH HAS JUST BROUGHT BACK FROM HELSINKI AND WHICH WILL BE SIGNED AT 11:00.

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AMBASSADOR SMITH IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO EXPLAIN THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, BUT I WANTED TO MAKE A FEW GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND HOW IT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT.

THE FIRST POINT TO MAKE IS THAT IN AN AGREEMENT THAT INVOLVES THE CENTRAL ARMAMENTS ON BOTH SIDES, IT IS FOOLISH OR SHORTSIGHTED TO APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF GAINING A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. NEITHER NATION WILL POSSIBLY CUT ITS SECURITY AND ITS SURVIVAL AT THE HAZARD OF ITS OPPONENT AND NO AGREEMENT THAT BRINGS DISADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE CAN POSSIBLY LAST AND CAN POSSIBLY BRING ABOUT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A NEW CIRCLE OF INSECURITY. THEREFORE, THE TEMTATION THAT IS EVER PRESENT WHEN AGREEMENTS OF THIS KIND ARE ANALYZED AS TO WHO WON IS EXCEPTIONALLY INAPPROPRIATE.

WE HAVE APPROACHED THESE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING WITH THE ATTITUDE THAT A WISE PROPOSAL IS ONE THAT IS CONCEIVED BY EACH SIDE TO BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST AND WE BELIEVE THAT IF THIS AGREEMENT DOES WHAT WE HOPE IT WILL, THAT THE FUTURE WILL RECORD THAT BOTH SIDES WON.

SECONDLY, LET ME MAKE A FEW OBSERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FREEZE OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WHICH HAS PERHAPS SOME OF THE MORE COMPLICATED PROVISIONS AND THE ANTICIPATION OF WHICH HAS AROUSED SOME ANTICIPATORY COMMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

FIRST, THE FREEZE CONCERNS ONLY TWO CATEGORIES OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS; THAT IS TO SAY, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES AND SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS, NOR DOES IT INCLUDE BOMBERS, NOR DOES IT INCLUDE, OBVIOUSLY, OTHER SYSTEMS

BASED ELSEWHERE THAN AT SEA OR IN THE TERRITORY OF EACH COUNTRY.

SECONDLY, IN ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREEZE, IT IS NOT USEFUL TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE FREEZE REFLECTS A GAP BETWEEN THE FORCES THAT ARE BEING FROZEN.

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IN THE TWO CATEGORIES THAT ARE BEING FROZEN, THAT IS TO SAY ICRMS AND SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, THE FACTS ARE THESE: THE SOVIET UNION HAS MORE INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES THAN THE UNITED STATES. THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN BUILDING INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES; THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT AND HAS NO SUCH PROGRAM AT THE MOMENT.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN BUILDING SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES AT THE RATE OF EIGHT SUBMARINES A YEAR. THE UNITED STATES HAS AT THIS MOMENT NO SUBMARINES UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

THEREFORE, THE QUESTION TO ASK IN ASSESSING THE FREEZE IS NOT WHAT SITUATION IT PERPETUATES, BUT WHAT SITUATION IT PREVENTS. THE QUESTION IS WHERE WE WOULD BE WITHOUT THE FREEZE. AND IF YOU PROJECT THE EXISTING BUILDING PROGRAMS OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE FUTURE, AS AGAINST THE ABSENCE OF BUILDING PROGRAMS OVER THE PERIOD OF THE FREEZE IN EITHER OF THE CATEGORIES THAT ARE BEING FROZEN, YOU WILL GET A MORE CORRECT CLUE TO WHY WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GOOD AGREEMENT AND WHY WE BELIEVE THAT IT HAS MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO ARRESTING THE ARMS RACE.

THE WEAPONS ARE FROZEN, AS WE POINTED OUT, IN CATEGORIES IN WHICH WE HAVE NO ONGOING PROGRAMS. NOW, HAVING SAID THIS, HOWEVER, I AM NOT IMPLYING THAT WE GAINED A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE BECAUSE IT IS PERHAPS TRUE THAT IN THE ABM FIELD WE HAD THE MORE DYNAMIC PROGRAM WHICH IS BEING ARRESTED AS A RESULT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

WHAT I AM SAYING IS THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN MADE THROUGH A LONG PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS; THAT THIS WEEK, WHILE OUR DELEGATION WAS WORKING AROUND THE CLOCK IN HELSINKI, THE PRESIDENT MET WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS EXTENSIVELY AND SOME MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION HAD EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SMIRNOFF AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO RESOLVE THOSE ISSUES THAT REQUIRED A PRIMARILY POLITICAL DECISION.

THE REASON IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SUCH AN

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AGREEMENT IS BECAUSE WE ARE CONFIDENT IT WILL BE SEEN TO BE IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF HUMANITY. THAT IS WHAT I WANTED TO SAY ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT.

I WOULD LIKE AGAIN TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO AMBASSADOR SMITH, WHO HAS BORNE UP UNDER GREAT STRAIN AND WHO HAS DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT BEFORE HIM.

I WILL LET HIM COMMENT ON THOSE AND THEN BOTH OF US WILL BE AVAILABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I UNDERSTAND I AM GOING TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY LATER TO GO INTO GREATER DETAIL WITH YOU ALL ABOUT THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, SO PERHAPS AT THIS TIME I SHOULD LIMIT MYSELF TO TRYING TO MAKE SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND THEN LATER ON TRY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS AND EVEN LATER ON THAN THAT GO INTO ANY SPECIFIC PROVISIONS THAT ARE OF SPECIAL INTEREST.

FIRST, LET ME SAY PERHAPS THE OBVIOUS, THAT THESE DOCUMENTS ARE THE PRODUCT OF LONG, CAREFUL, COMPLEX AND EXHAUSTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WE WERE NOT FINISHED WITH THE LAST DETAIL AFTER WE GOT ON THE AIRPLANE THIS EVENING IN HELSINKI. WE FLEW BACK. I INVITED SOME OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, INCLUDING THE CHIEF DELEGATION MINISTER, SEMENOV, TO JOIN US AND WE CONTINUED TO WORK ON OUR WAY HERE TO MOSCOW. SO THIS IS ABOUT THE FRESHEST TREATY THAT I HAVE EVER TALKED ABOUT.

I THINK THAT IN SUM, THESE DOCUMENTS, WHEN YOU LOOK AT THEM CAREFULLY, WILL DEMONSTRATE A SOLID, CONCRETE, YET FIRST STEP IN THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING STRATEGIC ARMS. THEY ARE NOT THE END OF THE ROAD BY ANY MEANS, BUT I THINK THAT THEY ARE A VERY SOLID STEP FORWARD.

YOU KNOW WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION THAT SOMETIMES PEOPLE FORGET UNDER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OF SOME

YEARS AGO TO GET ON WITH TRYING TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS AND GET ON WITH DISARMAMENT. I THINK AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION

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THESE DOCUMENTS WILL SHOW THAT WE ARE NOT LAX IN THAT RESPECT. WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES.

NOW, AS HENRY SAID, THERE ARE TWO BASIC DOCUMENTS HERE, THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH, IN EFFECT, IS A NEGOTIATING FREEZE ARRANGEMENT TO HOLD THE SITUATION, TO PERMIT US TO HOPEFULLY NEGOTIATE A TREATY TO MATCH IN THE OFFENSIVE FIELD THE TREATY THAT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN NEGOTIATING IN THE DEFENSIVE FIELD.

IN THE DEFENSIVE FIELD, I WOULD URGE YOU TO LOOK VERY CAREFULLY AT THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE I WHICH LOOKS VERY GENERAL BUT TO MY MIND IS A MOST SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO GREAT POWERS.

IN EFFECT, IT SAYS THAT NEITHER SIDE IS GOING TO TRY TO DEFEND ITS NATIONWIDE TERRITORY. THIS IS AN ADMISSION OF TREMENDOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE, I BELIEVE, RECOGNITION THAT THE DETERRENT FORCES OF BOTH SIDES ARE NOT GOING TO BE CHALLENGED.

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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SECT 36

SUBJECT: KISSINGER AND SMITH SALT BACKGROUNTERS - PART ONE

WHEN YOU THINK OF THE CONCERN THAT WE HAVE HAD
FOR THE LAST 25 YEARS ABOUT FIRST-STRIKE AND COUNTER-FORCE,
IT SEEMS TO ME A GENERAL RECOGNITION BY BOTH COUNTRIES THAT
THEY ARE NOT GOING TO FIELD A NATIONWIDE SYSTEM IS OF FIRST
IMPORTANCE, POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARILY.

IN ADDITION TO THAT, THE COUNTRIES ARE GOING TO
AGREE NOT TO LAY THE BASE FOR SUCH A NATIONWIDE SYSTEM.
THAT GOT US INTO ALL SORTS OF RADAR PROBLEMS WHICH SOME OF
YOU PEOPLE PERHAPS FELT WE TOOK TOO LONG IN SOLVING, BUT
MUCH OF THE TIME WE AVE SPENT WAS IN TRYING TO WRESTLE WITH
THIS RADAR
PROBLEM TO PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY OF A NATION-
WIDE SYSTEM ARISING.

IN ADDITION TO THAT, THE TWO NATIONS HAVE MADE
COMMITMENTS NOT TO EVEN TRY FOR A THICK OR REGIONAL DEFENSE IN
ONE PART OF THE COUNTRY EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY PERMITTED
UNDER THE AGREEMENT; THAT IS, TO DEFEND ONE'S CAPITAL OR TO
DEFEND A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF ICBM SILOS.

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SO, ALTHOUGH ARTICLE I LOOKS LIKE SORT OF A GENERAL STATEMENT, TO MY MIND IT IS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES IN THE WHOLE AGREEMENT.

NOW, ARTICLE II DEFINES WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT AND HAS A VERY IMPORTANT BEARING ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF WHAT WE CALL FUTURE ABM SYSTEMS. THIS TREATY HAS AS A MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT THAT IT NOT ONLY LIMITS THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT HAS A CHOKING OFF EFFECT ON FUTURE SYSTEMS WHICH, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TREATY AS WE HAVE REACHED UNDERSTANDINGS, FUTURES WILL NOT BE DEPLOYABLE UNLESS THIS TREATY IS AMENDED.

ARTICLE III IS THE HEART OF THE TREATY AND DESERVES A GREAT DEAL OF STUDY. I THINK WE SPENT MORE TIME TRYING TO WRESTLE WITH ARTICLE III THAN ANY OTHER PART OF THE TREATY.

I WILL GO INTO DETAILS LATER IF YOU LIKE, BUT IT SAYS BOTH SIDES CAN HAVE TWO SITES WITH NO MORE THAN 100

LAUNCHERS AT EACH SITE, WITH RADAR SHARPLY LIMITED; ONE SITE FOR THE DEFENSIVE CAPITAL AND ONE FOR THE ICBM'S. THE SOVIETS WILL AGREE TO DEPLOY THE ICBM SITE WELL AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL SITE, SO THE POSSIBILITY FOR A BASE OF A

NATIONWIDE SYSTEM IS VERY POOR.

IN ADDITION TO THE NUMBERS, WE HAVE HAD TO WORK OUT PROBLEMS INVOLVING TEST RANGES, NUMBERS OF TEST LAUNCHERS, THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION, THE QUESTION OF HOW YOU VERIFY THIS TREATY, AND ONE OF THE SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS THAT WE HAVE REACHED IS THAT THIS TREATY CAN SAFELY BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, THAT IS, WITHOUT ON-SITE INSPECTION. THIS IS LARGELY A LIMITATION ON NUMBERS OF RELATIVELY LARGE OBJECTS WHICH WE ARE CONFIDENT CAN BE MONITORED, IF YOU WILL, WITHOUT ON-SITE INSPECTION.

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IF I HAD MY "DRUTHERS" AND COULD HAVE ON-SITE INSPECTION INSTEAD OF OUR PRESENT NATIONAL

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MEANS, THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT WE WOULD BE MUCH BETTER OFF WITH NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

IN ADDITION TO THAT, WE WILL HAVE COMMITMENTS FROM THE SOVIETS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THOSE NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND NOT TO TAKE MEASURES TO CONCEAL THEIR OPERATION SO AS TO PREVENT THE WORKINGS OF NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. I THINK YOU LADIES AND GENTLEMEN CAN REALIZE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A NATION MAKING SUCH A COMMITMENT AS THAT.

WE ARE GOING TO SET UP A JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WHICH WILL, IN EFFECT, ACT AS A SURVEYING AGENT THAT WILL WATCH OVER THE OPERATION OF THE AGREEMENT, TO WHICH AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS CAN BE REFERRED, WHICH WILL BE A FORUM FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO SEE HOW THIS TREATY IS WORKING, AND TO MAKE SURE THAT IT STAYS VIABLE OVER THE YEARS.

THIS TREATY WILL HAVE INDEFINITE DURATION, BUT IF IT DOESN'T WORK, IF OUR SUPREME INTERESTS ARE JEOPARDIZED, THERE IS A PROVISION THAT ON SHORT NOTICE EITHER SIDE CAN ESCAPE FROM THE BINDING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY.

TURN, NOW, FOR A MINUTE TO THE OFFENSIVE SIDE. AS HENRY SAID, WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO SET UP A USEFUL DEVICE THAT WILL HOLD THE SITUATION WHILE WE NEGOTIATE, HOPEFULLY, A MATCHING TREATY; THAT IS, TO MATCH THE TREATY IN THE ABM DEFENSE FIELD. I THINK THAT THE MEASURES THAT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SPELLING OUT IN THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS WILL DO JUST THAT. THERE WILL BE A COMMITMENT ON THEIR PART NOT TO BUILD ANY MORE OF THESE ICBMS THAT HAVE CONCERNED US OVER THE YEARS. THAT COMMITMENT WILL EXTEND TO NOT BUILDING SUCH THINGS AS SS-9, AND THERE WILL BE PROVISIONS THAT IF THE SIDES WANT TO INCREASE THEIR SUBMARINE MISSILES, WHICH, IF YOU CAN SAY SO, ARE A MORE BENIGN FORM OF WEAPONS SYSTEM THAN ICBMS, THEY MAY DO SO, BUT ONLY AT THE PRICE OF A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION PROGRAM IN OTHER WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

KEEP THIS IN MIND WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING SLRMS. IT IS NOT FOR FREE. IT IS AT A VERY SUBSTANTIAL PRICE IN TERMS OF REDUCTIONS OF OTHER WEAPONS

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SYSTEMS. REDUCTIONS HAVE NEVER BEFORE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED, SO I THINK THIS OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED A GREAT ACCOMPLISHMENT.

I THINK I HAD BETTER STOP AT THAT, SINCE I AM GOING TO HAVE A CHANCE TO GO INTO SPECIFICS. I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE TO BE SOME QUESTIONS AT THIS POINT.

Q MR. SMITH, COULD YOU ANSWER JUST A COUPLE OF BASIC THINGS? ON THE QUESTION OF THE RADAR, COULD YOU GIVE US AN ESTIMATE OF WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY WILL BE PROTECTED BY THE ABM RADAR ON EACH SIDE?

SECONDLY, ON THE OFFENSIVE SIDE, THE SUBMARINES, THERE ARE NO FIGURES IN THE FACT SHEET, AND THE PHRASING THERE SEEMS TO BE A LITTLE AMBIGUOUS. COULD YOU GIVE US WHAT YOU CONSIDER TO BE, IN TERMS OF NUMBERS, THE CURRENT LEVELS OF SUBMARINES ON EACH SIDE?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: ON THE QUESTION OF RADAR, I CANNOT GIVE YOU A PRECISE PERCENTAGE. THE RADAR COVERAGE, OF COURSE, IS NOT THE ESSENTIAL CONSIDERATION. NO RE-ENTRY VEHICLE WAS EVER KILLED BY A RADAR. IT TAKES A LOT OF INTERCEPTORS, IN ADDITION TO RADAR, TO DO A DEFENSIVE JOB. THE RADAR COVERAGE, HOWEVER, WILL BE MINUTE, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF RADAR AROUND ICBM FIELDS, WHERE THERE WILL BE QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS AS WELL AS QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, SO ONLY A RELATIVELY FEW RADARS WILL BE PERMITTED IN THESE ICBM FIELDS.

WE ARE QUITE CONFIDENT THAT A RADAR BASE FOR A NATION-WIDE OR THICK REGIONAL DEFENSE IS NOT POSSIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS TREATY.

NOW, IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF SUBMARINES, I WOULD LIKE TO RESERVE THAT UNTIL I CAN GO INTO IT MORE SPECIFICALLY.

Q ON THE LIMITATION OF TWO ABM SITES, WE ARE BUILDING TWO NOW IN THE FAR WEST. DOES THAT MEAN WE ABANDON ONE OF THOSE AROUND THOSE ICBM SILOS AND BUILD ANOTHER ONE AROUND WASHINGTON?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: IF WE EXERCISE OUR RIGHTS UNDER

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THE TREATY, WE WILL BUILD A SYSTEM AROUND WASHINGTON. OUR OBLIGATION UNDER THE TREATY WILL BE TO HAVE NOT MORE THAN ONE WHICH WE HAD DESIGNATED AS GRAND FORKS. SO UNDER THE TREATY THE MALMSTROM CONSTRUCTION WOULD BE STOPPED.

Q DO THE RUSSIANS COMPLETE THEIR CONSTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES PRESENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION? THEY HAVE 17 OPERATION AND 25 PRESUMABLY AT SOME STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION. WILL THEY BE ALLOWED TO COMPLETE THOSE BEFORE THE FREEEE BECOMES EFFECTIVE?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: UNDER THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, THEY WILL BE PERMITTED TO FINISH CONSTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES, YES. I WOULD LIKE TO GO INTO THE WHOLE SUBMARINE QUESTION IN GREATER DETAIL LATER.

Q WOULD YOU CLEAR UP THE WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS FROM THE TREATY "...IF SUPREME INTERESTS ARE JEOPARDIZED AND ON SIX MONTH'S NOTICE"? IS THAT "AND/OR" OR MUST BOTH CONDITIONS BE PREVALENT, A SUPREME INTEREST ENDANGERED, DOES THIS THEN REQUIRE SIX MONTH'S NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: THIS IS CORRECT. THAT IS THE SAME CONDITION AS IN PREVIOUS ARMS CONTROL TREATIES, SUCH AS THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.

DOES THIS COMMISSION DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT SUPREME INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: NO. THAT IS A UNILATERAL DECISION FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

Q DOESN'T THIS ALLOW THEM TO PROTECT ALL OF THEIR ICBMS WHILE WE PROTECT ONLY SOME OF OURS?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: NO. THIS WILL PERMIT THEM TO PROTECT A SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF THEIR ICBMS THAN OURS, SINCE THEY HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN WE HAVE.

Q IF AFTER FIVE YEARS THERE IS NO COMPREHENSIVE OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT, DOES THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LAPSE?

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AMBASSADOR SMITH: IF THE FIVE YEARS IS PAST AND THE NEGOTIATIONS LOOK FRUITLESS, I WOULD THINK WE WOULD NOT WANT TO CONTINUE IT. IF THE NEGOTIATIONS LOOK AS IF THEY MIGHT STILL BEAR FRUIT, IF BOTH SIDES AGREE TO EXTEND THE FIVE-YEAR ARRANGEMENT, THAT IS CERTAINLY IN OUR FIELD OF VISION.

Q THE BASIC STORY IS GOING TO GO OUT OF THIS SESSION. I THINK WE HAVE TO GET FIGURES ON SUBMARINES AND OTHER ESTIMATES, OTHERWISE THE STORY WILL GO OUT IN A GOBBLED WAY.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: THIS TREATY WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON WARHEAD NUMBERS. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE FREE TO MOUNT AS MANY WARHEADS AS THEY WANT. AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED STATES HAS A VERY SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGE, AND I DO NOT SEE IN THE TIME PERIOD OF THIS FREEZE THAT THERE IS ANY PROSPECT OF ITS LOSING IT.

Q WHAT ABOUT THE SUBMARINES, THE QUESTION OF FIGURES? IS THIS FIGURE OF 42 Y CLASS SUBMARINES AN ACCURATE ONE THAT THEY WILL BE ALLOWED TO COMPLETE, AND WE WITH 41?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THIS FIGURE OF 42 SUBMARINES. I HAVE SEEN ALL SORTS OF SPECULATIONS ABOUT SOVIET SUBMARINES, BUT IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT UNDER THIS AGREEMENT IF THE SOVIETS WANT TO PAY THE PRICE OF SCRAPPING A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF OTHER IMPORTANT STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS THEY CAN BUILD ADDITIONAL SUBMARINES.

Q WHAT SUBMARINES DO THEY HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION NOW? I THINK YOU ARE EVADING THE POINT ON THE NUMBER OF SUBMARINES THEY WILL BE FROZEN AT UNDER THIS TREATY.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I AM PURPOSELY EVADING THE POINT BECAUSE THAT IS AN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE THAT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE OUT.

Q HOW MANY OLD SUBMARINES, THE OLD SUBMARINES WITH THREE OBSOLETE LAUNCHERS ON THEM, WOULD THEY BE ABLE TO CONVERT?

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AMBASSADOR SMITH: I WOULD HAVE TO ANSWER THAT THE SAME WAY. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO DESCRIBE THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SOVIET FLEET BETWEEN OLD AND NEW SUBMARINES.

Q YOU ARE LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A VERY LARGE SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THE SLBM FIELD.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I AM LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT YOU ARE FACING AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. WE DON'T KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL LAST. IF WE NEGOTIATE A TREATY WITHIN A YEAR, THE THE SOVIET SUBMARINE LEVEL, IF THEY ELECT TO FOLLOW THIS ROUTE, WILL BE ONE THING. IF IT IS TWO YEARS, IT WILL BE ANOTHER. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT THEY COULD, AT A HIGH PRICE, INCREASE THEIR SUBMARINE FLEET.

Q MR. AMBASSADOR, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO COMPLETE THEIR CONSTRUCTION OF Y CLASS SUBMARINES AND MODERNIZE THEIR OLDER SUBMARINES TO BECOME NEA Y CLASS SUBMARINES AND IF THEY DO ALL OF THIS AND PAY THE PRICE, AS YOU SAID, OF RETIRING THE SS-7 AND SS-8 MISSILES, WHAT IS THE ADVANTAGE TO THEM, TO RETIRE THE MISSILES, FOR EXAMPLE, AND KEEP THESE SUBMARINES, DO THEY HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IF THEY DO THAT?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I CANNOT TELL YOU WHAT THE FACTORS MAKING FACILITIES AT FORCE PLANNING ARE. ALL I CAN DO IS EXPLAIN THE PROVISIONS OF THESE TREATIES. NOW, WHAT THE SOVIETS WILL DO WITH THE RIGHTS UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT IS SOMETHING THAT WE CAN NOT KNOW.

MR. ZIEGLER: WE HAVE TIME FOR JUST ONE MORE QUESTION. WE ARE RUNNING SHORT OF TIME. DR. KISSINGER HAS ONE COMMENT TO MAKE.

Q WE HAVE HAD ONLY TEN MINUTES OF QUESTIONS.

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ACTION ACDA-19

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CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
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SECTO 36

SUBJECT: KISSINGER AND SMITH SALT BACKGROUNTERS - PART ONE

MR. ZIEGLER: THE ENTIRE DELEGATION AND DR.
KISSINGER WILL BE AVAILABE AT THE PRESS CENTER LATER
TONIGHT.

DR. KISSINGER: SINCE I AM NOT QUITE AS CONSTRAINED
OR DON'T FEEL AS CONSTRAINED AS AMBASSADOR SMITH, LEST
WE BUILD UP A PROFOUND ATMOSPHERE OF MYSTERY ABOUT THE
SUBMARINE ISSUE, I WILL STRAIGHTEN IT OUT AS BEST I CAN.

THE BASE NUMBER OF SOVIET SURMARINES IS IN DISPUTE.
IT HAS BEEN IN DISPUTE IN OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE EXACTLY
HOW MUCH IT IS, THOUGH OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE IN THE
RANGE THAT WAS SUGGESTED.

Q 41 TO 43?

DR. KISSINGER: I AM NOT GOING TO GO BEYOND WHAT
I HAVE SAID. IT IS IN THAT GENERAL RANGE.

THE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THEIR PROGRAM IS SLIGHTLY
MORE EXHAUSTIVE. THEY, OF COURSE, HAVE THE ADVANTAGE THAT

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THEY KNOW WHAT IT IS PRECISELY. (LAUGHTER)

NOW THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, ARE THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN CONVERT LAND-BASED MISSILES OF A CATEGORY OF WHICH WE ESTIMATE THAT THEY HAVE 210, PLUS 30-ODD MISSILES ON OLDER NUCLEAR SUBMARINES, INTO SUBMARINES OR SUBMARINE-BASED LAUNCHERS.

THIS, THEN, WOULD GIVE THEM A FIGURE OF SUBMARINES AND LAUNCHERS SUBSTANTIALLY ABOUT THE LEVEL THAT IS NOW ESTIMATED AS BEING UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THIS LEVEL HAS A UPPER CEILING.

NOW, THERE ARE TWO THINGS TO BE SAID: ONE, THEY CAN REACH THIS LEVEL ONLY AT THE SACRIFICE OF EXISTING WEAPON SYSTEMS AND, THEREFORE, IT WOULD REPRESENT THE FIRST REDUCTION OF ONE CATEGORY OF WEAPONS. SECOND, IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION WAS BUILDING SUBMARINES AT THE RATE OF EIGHT OR NINE A YEAR IN ANY EVENT, AND THEIR DECISION TO BUILD THESE SUBMARINES AT THAT RATE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN FIXED FOR SOME TIME.

THEREFORE, THE CEILING ON SUBMARINES HAS TO BE SEEN IN TERMS OF TWO FACTORS: FACTOR ONE, WHERE WOULD THE SOVIET UNION BE WITHOUT THAT CEILING? AND WITHOUT THAT CEILING THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE SOME 50 PERCENT HIGHER OVER THE PERIOD OF TIME IF IT EXERCISED ITS FULL CAPACITY OF PRODUCTION. SECOND, IN ORDER TO REACH THAT CEILING, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE TO TRADE IN HEAVY LAND-BASED MISSILES AND/OR SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES OF OLDER TYPES. SO THAT IN ADDITION TO ARRESTING THE MOMENTUM OF THE SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, THERE IS ALSO A REDUCTION OF WEAPONS THAT WOULD UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES NOT HAVE BEEN REDUCED.

THE NEXT QUESTION THAT CAN BE ASKED THEN: WELL, PERHAPS THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS SOVIET SUBMARINE PROGRAM WOULD HAVE BEEN TO BUILD MORE SUBMARINES OF OUR OWN.

I THINK THOSE OF YOU WHO FOLLOWED DEFENSE MATTERS KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO PLAN AT THIS MOMENT -- AND FOR THAT MATTER HAD NO PLAN BEFORE THIS AGREEMENT -- TO BUILD SUBMARINES OVER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD OF THE

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FREEZE THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS LASTING. SO WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO LIVE WITH A CONDITION WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE THAN IT IS WITH THE AGREEMENT AND: SECONDLY, THAT THE FREEZE IS PURCHASED BY THE REDUCTION OF SEVERAL HUNDRED -- IF THE SOVIETS EXERCISE ALL THEIR RIGHTS -- LAND-BASED MISSILES AND ANOTHER CATEGORY OF SEA-BASED MISSILES.

THIS IS THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE SURMARINE DECISION HAS TO BE SEEN.

Q ON A POINT OF FACT, HENRY, DIDN'T THE DEFENSE SECRETARY ANNOUNCE A PROGRAM FOR 10 ULMS OR TRIDENT MISSILES?

DR. KISSINGER: NONE OF THOSE WILL BECOME OPERATIONAL UNTIL AFTER THE PERIOD OF THE FREEZE.

Q COULD I MAKE A PLEA TO YOU AND RON AS WELL? IT HAS TAKEN 30 MONTHS TO GET THIS TREATY. THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO KNOW WHAT IS IN IT. THERE IS AN ARGUMENT ABOUT IT. WE HAVE BEEN OUT OF OUR HOTEL AN HOUR AND A HALF. WE GET TEN MINUTES OF QUESTIONS AND TOMORROW IT IS GOING TO BE OUR FAULT FOR SCREWING IT UP AND CREATING POLITICAL TROUBLE. CAN SOMEBODY ELSE PASS UP THE CHAMPAGNE AND LET'S KEEP THIS GOING?

MR. ZIEGLER: I SUPPOSE YOU ARE ASKING BY PASSING UP THE CHAMPAGNE THAT HENRY NOT GO TO THE SIGNING. THAT HAS TO BE HIS DECISION. AMBASSADOR SMITH MUST GO TO THE SIGNING. I WILL OFFER YOU THIS ALTERNATIVE, RECOGNIZING THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE BEEN HERE AN HOUR AND A HALF, AND

RECOGNIZING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE TO HAVE THE MATERIAL TO PUT TOGETHER TO PROVIDE YOU WHICH, AS AMBASSADOR SMITH SAID, WAS PUT TOGETHER AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN. THE OPTION IS TO HAVE THE BRIEFING, AS WE HAVE SCHEDULED, AT THE PRESS CENTER IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SIGNING.

Q YOU KNOW WHAT KIND OF A BRAWL THAT WILL BE.

MR. ZIEGLER: WE WOULD BE WILLING TO RETURN HERE TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS IF THAT IS WHAT YOU WOULD LIKE.

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Q WILL WE HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE RUSSIAN COMMENTARY ON THIS ONE.

MR. ZIEGLER: THAT IS EXACTLY THE DILEMMA.

Q I HAVE ONE QUESTION THAT I KNOW WOULD CLEAR UP MY CONFUSION AND MAYBE SOME OTHERS' CONFUSION. DOES THE TREATY PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO COMPLETE THEIR PRESENT SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION WITHOUT PENALTY?

DR. KISSINGER: YES.

Q WILL THESE TRIDENTS REPLACE OLD POLARIS SUBMARINES IN THAT CASE?

DR. KISSINGER: NO ULMS SUBMARINES WILL BE OPERATIONAL UNTIL AFTER THE FREEZE IS OVER. THERE WILL BE PROVISIONS IN THE TREATY FOR WHEN AN EXISTING WEAPON HAS TO BE SCRAPPED IN TERMS OF THE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM. IF, IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ULMS SUCH A POINT SHOULD BE REACHED BEFORE THE END OF THE FREEZE AND IF THE TREATY HAS NOT BEEN EXTENDED BY AGREEMENT, THEN OF COURSE THOSE SCRAPPING PROVISIONS WOULD GO INTO EFFECT. OTHERWISE THE ULMS WOULD BE A FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM TO THE EXISTING ONE.

MR. ZIEGLER: LET ME OFFER THIS PROPOSAL TO YOU: THE SIGNING TAKES PLACE AT 11:00 O'CLOCK. AT THAT TIME THE FACT THAT THE SALT AGREEMENT IS BEING SIGNED IS INDEED A FACT. THERE IS A BRIEFING SCHEDULED AT ABOUT 11:20 AT THE PRESS CENTER, JOINT BRIEFING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THAT WILL BE SHORT. WE WILL ARRANGE TO MAKE THAT SHORT. FOLLOWING THAT, AND GIVING THOSE WHO ARE ON DEAD-LING -- AND I DON'T BELIEVE ANYONE HAS ANY SERIOUS PROBLEM AT THAT POINT -- THAT IS THE POINT WHEN WE WILL RETURN TO THIS LOCATION, FOLLOWING THE JOINT BRIEFING WHICH WE ARE COMMITTED TO AT THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS CENTER. SO, IF THAT GETS UNDERWAY AT ABOUT 11:30, IT WILL BE OVER BY ABOUT 12:00. WE WILL RETURN HERE AT ABOUT 12:30. WE WILL TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS. DR. KISSINGER WILL BE HERE AND WE WILL PROCEED.

Q CAN'T WE DO IT AT THE HOTEL?

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MR. ZIEGLER: IF THERE IS A CHANGE, GENTLEMEN, IF
THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE LOCATION, IF WE CAN FIND A PLACE AT
THE HOTEL, WE WILL ARRANGE FOR IT.

THE PRESS: THANK YOU , GENTLEMEN.

END (AT 10:55 P.M..MOSCOW TIME)

ROGERS

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